To ameliorate the quality of protection provided by intrusion detection systems (IDS) we strongly need more effective evaluation and testing procedures. Evaluating an IDS against all known and unknown attacks is probably impossible. Nevertheless, a sensible selection of representative attacks is necessary to obtain an unbiased evaluation of such systems. To overcome the problem of an unmanageably large set of possible inputs, software testers usually divide the data input domain into categories (or equivalence classes), and select representative instances from each category as test cases. We believe that the same principle could be applied to IDS testing if we have a reasonable classification. In this paper we make a thorough analysis of existing attack classifications in order to determine whether they could be helpful in selecting attack test cases. Then, we construct a new scheme to classify attacks relying on those attributes that appear to be the best classification criteria.
INTRODUCTION
Known evaluations of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) suffer from serious shortcomings and often produce misleading results [1] . These defects are mainly due to (1) unsystematic approaches, (2) non-representative test cases, (3) incorrect metrics and (4) absence of sensitivity analysis on test datasets. In order to obtain a reasonably unbiased evaluation, these problems should be eliminated. In this paper, we focus on the second problem: the selection of representative test cases.
Intrusion Detection Systems should aim at detecting all attacks that either already exist or will probably appear in the future.
IDS evaluations need to cope with the whole attack space to determine the superiority of an IDS and its quality of detection. However, the attack space is too large to be enumerated and used as a dataset, for practical reasons. With this huge number of possible inputs to the IDS (i.e., attacks), the challenge resides in: (1) selecting a reasonable number of attack test cases that provide a good representation of all possible inputs; (2) ensuring a good coverage to activate and exercise the different parts of the IDS. Such work has major benefits as it will reduce the number of attack test-cases and make the test process more manageable. It will also enhance the coverage of the attack domain space in the test dataset, as we can know those attack types against which the IDS was tested or not tested The paper is organized as follows: In §2 we analyze several attack classifications and also discuss the reasons that make these classifications helpless for the selection of attack test cases. Then, we propose a new classification in §3. Finally, we introduce a complementary approach for selecting attack test cases and the conclusions in §4 and §5 respectively.
ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE CLASSIFICATIONS
We firstly examined several attack classifications [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , and [10] to decide whether one can match our objective (i.e., IDS evaluation and testing). They may have different viewpoints and use inconsistent attribute names. However, we can notice that they are generally based on attributes of attack and/or vulnerability such as the following ones: ignoring other descriptive attributes that could be operationally important such as: the consequences, the privileges acquired and the source of attacks. Such attributes are necessary for the configuration of the evaluation platform and also to determine where/how the generated attack test cases will be injected. Beside that, it contains very fine grained dimensions although the level of detail attained has minor significance for the tested IDS. For instance, the dimension interface object -that contains 24 typesconsiders 5 distinctive types related to the application layer.
In fact, the examined classifications are not appropriate for the evaluation of IDS for several reasons. First, they often take the attacker rather than the IDS (the defense) viewpoint and have attributes out of the scope of the IDS. Thus, they often ignore or mask significant attack features. Second, they have ambiguous, inconsistently defined attributes. Third, they have a huge number of classes. Fourth, there is no accompanying scheme for test case selection. In the following, we will present a new classification of attacks that aims to avoid the previous shortcomings.
TOWARDS A NEW CLASSIFICATION
Developing a good classification of attacks that takes the evaluator's viewpoint yields many benefits. First, it will reduce drastically the number of necessary test cases. Second, more comprehensive evaluation with better coverage of attack space could be obtained. To explain that, let us consider the random selection of attack test-cases. Evaluators usually test their systems in an ad-hoc manner using few attack scripts available in their hands or on security mailing lists although the available attack scripts do not reflect the attack distributions or even cover some critical attack types. Third, expressing the results of the evaluation in terms of attack types will provide a more precise image of results. For example, a misunderstanding could arise from the generalization of conclusions when expressing the results for all attacks included in test-cases whereas the tested IDS is weak in detecting certain type of attacks and strong in detecting another.
In order to obtain a good classification, it should satisfy the following requirements [3] , [10]:
1. Completeness/exhaustive: it means that a categorization scheme should take into account all possible attacks (e.g., known and unknown). 2. Clear and unambiguous criteria: if each dimension has a number of distinct classes, an attack can be classified by picking up one and only one distinct class from each dimension. 3. Mutually exclusive: to ensure that an attack is placed at most in one category 4. Repeatable: The clear steps to classify an attack ensure that it should be placed always in the same category. 5. Compliance with existing standards, such as vulnerability databases and dictionaries that have become de facto standards in security. In addition, the classification should:
6. Has a complementary scheme for attack test-case selection amongst thousands of attack classes.
7. take into account attack generation aspects, which is essential for the evaluation process (e.g., information about the configuration of the test platform).
Suggesting a New Classification
We examined carefully the attributes mentioned in §2 to determine which attributes are significant from the IDSperspective. Issues that are invisible for IDS or meaningless for the evaluation will be discarded. For example, dimensions such as the attacker's objective (intention) will not be treated anymore within this classification since it is both hard and useless to discover the attackers' intention. Similarly, both the type and detection technique dimensions do not provide precise, clear cut categories. While the results and security property (security threat) dimensions give an indication about the expected damage, it is out of the IDS scope.
According the analysis that we made and the stated requirements, we have adopted a new classification. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , it has five dimensions that reflect attack manifestations as well as evaluation-relevant aspects:
1. the firing source that indicates the place from which the attacks or the attack test case are launched. It has two distinct classes: remote and local. 2. the privilege escalation: regarding whether the attack results in promoting the access level, four distinct classes that correspond to the gained access level: root, user, System and none. The last covers attacks that do not need or do not result in any access to system resources. (e.g., remote DoS attacks). 3. the vulnerability dimension: was particularly added to express the relationship between attacks and vulnerability databases. It can point to a specific vulnerability exploited by the attack. For now, the classification indicates whether the vulnerability is due to configuration or design/ implementation flaws. 4. the carrier dimension explains the means by which the attack reaches its victim: either via network traffic or through an action performed locally on the machine and does not appear on the network interface. 5. the last dimension is the targeted object. Attackers may target the memory, the operating system, the network stack, a file system object or a process.
Our classification does not focus only on the observable characteristics of attacks like did [9] and [10]. It considers also operational issues that are important for administrators. For example, the severity of attacks is reflected implicitly by privilege escalation dimension. Also, the source of danger (i.e., the firing source and the vulnerability types) could suggest how the risk could be alleviated by which counter measure (e.g., modify firewall rules to block a remote source or search a missed patch). Moreover, it does not ignore the evaluators' needs where it provides essential information for the generation of attacks and the analysis of test data. For example, the firing source dimension gives an idea about the place from which an attack should be generated, and the vulnerability dimension tells whether a particular configuration should be set/unset.
Ideally, an IDS should behave (i.e., detect, undetect) in the same way against attacks that belong to the same class. Here, two cases could be distinguished: First, assuming that our classification is perfect: when we inject attacks from the same class, the IDS will ideally behave similarly for all attack instances. Otherwise, if the IDS behaves differently, we can conclude that the IDS has a problem of implementation and/or configuration (e.g., a lack of the corresponding signature). The second case: assuming that neither the IDS nor the classification are perfect and this is likely the case. To ensure the representativity of attacks in the test suite, we should use several instances of attacks of the same type and then make statistics on the results. This will enhance the quality of results with the price of increasing the number of test cases. The number of combinations produced from our classification is 1920 test cases compared to 9600 in [10] . Even though, the test cases can be reduced, regrouped and reordered to get only relevant ones by applying constraints or generation rules in CTE. For example, the following rule: [Remote * (root +system) * configuration vul * Network traffic * ( FS object + OS)] will result in 16 test case categories, which represent remote attacks that provide root or system access by exploiting configuration vulnerability and could be observed in network traffic targeting the system file or the operating system (Fig. 2) .
SELECTION SCHEME

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper argued that an evaluation oriented classification of attacks is needed. We demonstrated that the existing classifications and taxonomies do not match all the needs of IDS evaluation and testing. To fill this gap, we proposed a new classification scheme to be used by IDS evaluators and by network administrators to assess and test their IDS. Based on this classification and using the classification tree method, we introduced an approach to wisely select relevant attack test cases. Therefore, attack selection for IDS evaluation is no longer random or done blindly from the few attacks at hand. It can now be done systematically with respect to the whole attack space. The next step is to classify the existing attacks and exploits in order to populate the test cases by real attacks. Then, we will proceed toward our ultimate goal to perform unbiased evaluations of IDS. [11] M. Grochtmann, J. Wegener, K. Grimm, Test case design using classification trees and the classification-tree Editor CTE, Proc. of the 8th Int. SW Quality Week, pp. 1-11, 1995. 
